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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Earl Patterson was employed as a maintenance person 
for the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (“PLCB”) when he 
reported for duty at a PLCB-operated liquor store in 
Eddystone, Pennsylvania. Shortly after his arrival, the 
location’s assistant manager accused him of attempting to rob 
the store. Patterson was detained by the police as a result of the 
PLCB employee’s accusation. Patterson filed a Complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the PLCB 
alleging race discrimination and violations of Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection in connection with these events. 
Patterson now appeals the District Court’s Order granting the 
PLCB’s motion to dismiss his Complaint on Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity grounds.1 For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
On the morning of November 17, 2014, Patterson—an 
African-American male and a longtime PLCB employee 
performing maintenance—arrived at a PLCB-run store in 
Eddystone, Pennsylvania to inquire about the store’s operating 
                                                 
1 Patterson has withdrawn his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
and now bases his appeal on the District Court’s 
determination that his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred 
on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. 
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condition. Upon his arrival, Patterson asked for a manager and 
was directed by a store clerk to the assistant manager. Patterson 
then identified himself to the assistant manager as a 
maintenance worker for the PLCB and asked whether the 
store’s electricity and plumbing were in working order or if the 
store might otherwise be in need of repairs. The assistant 
manager became “very rude” to Patterson, so he exited the 
liquor store, entered his “state-owned van, and reported the 
assistant manager to his foreman over the phone.” App. 11. Per 
his foreman’s instruction, Patterson left the Eddystone store 
and drove towards another PLCB store in Newtown Square, 
Pennsylvania.  
En route to the Newtown Square store, Patterson was 
stopped by the police and questioned about “robbing” the 
Eddystone store. Id. During the stop, an officer informed 
Patterson that the Eddystone assistant manager had called to 
report a “black guy” in a “state van” who was trying to “rob 
her store.” App. 11-12. 
Patterson filed a Complaint against the PLCB alleging 
race discrimination and violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and 1983. The PLCB filed a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), which the District Court granted upon a 
finding that the PLCB was entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity from suit. Patterson appeals, arguing that 
the District Court erred in finding that the PLCB was an “arm” 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Patterson contends 
that, in reaching its conclusion that the PLCB is immunized 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the District Court 
improperly weighed this Court’s three-factor test, established 
in Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 
659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc). 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s 
dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Estate of 
Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 853 
(3d Cir. 2014). We review de novo whether an entity is entitled 
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to sovereign immunity. Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 
(3d Cir. 2018). 
III. 
Though, by its terms, the Eleventh Amendment 
immunizes only “States” against private actions brought by 
citizens of other states, see U.S. Const. amend. XI, it is “well 
established” that suits brought by in-state litigants against 
“arms” of a state “may nonetheless be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.” Karns, 879 F.3d at 512–13 (quoting Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), and Bowers v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 545 (3d Cir. 2007)); 
see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890).  
A party is an “arm of the state” for sovereign immunity 
purposes when “the state is the real, substantial party in 
interest.” Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 
459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 623 (2002). 
“[T]he relationship between the State and the entity in 
question” is critical to this inquiry. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). We employ a three-factor 
test to determine an entity’s sovereign immunity status: “(1) 
whether the payment of the judgment would come from the 
state; (2) what status the entity has under state law; and (3) 
what degree of autonomy the entity has.” Karns, 879 F.3d at 
513 (quoting Bowers, 475 F.3d at 546). We regard the three 
factors as “co-equal.” Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 
F.3d 233, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus after assessing in which 
direction each factor points, “we balance them to determine 
whether an entity amounts to an arm of the State.” Maliandi, 
845 F.3d at 84.  
Below, we will assess the factors and their relevant 
subfactors.  Part III.A. considers whether the state or the PLCB 
funds payment of an adverse judgment; Part III.B. reviews 
whether state law treats the PLCB as an arm of the state; and 
Part III.C. examines the PLCB’s autonomy relative to the state. 
A. 
When analyzing the funding factor, we first ask 
“[w]hether the money that would pay the judgment would 
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come from the state.” Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659. To evaluate this 
question, we consider three subfactors: (1) a state’s legal 
obligation to pay a money judgment entered against the entity; 
(2) whether the agency has money to satisfy the judgment; and 
(3) whether there are specific statutory provisions that 
immunize the state from liability for money judgments. Id.; see 
also Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 86. We evaluate each subfactor in 
turn, below. 
i. 
The first funding subfactor focuses on “whether the 
state treasury is legally responsible for the payment of a 
judgment.” Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 227, 233 
(3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if a state 
indemnifies an entity voluntarily, the funding factor will likely 
disfavor granting sovereign immunity. See Maliandi, 845 F.3d 
at 87. Pennsylvania is not legally obligated to pay for 
judgments entered against the PLCB. After the PLCB pays a 
judgment, the Governor may choose to reimburse the PLCB—
but there is no legal obligation to do so. See 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 744-910 (“The State Treasurer is hereby authorized and 
directed to transfer such sums from the General Fund to the 
State Stores Fund as the Governor . . . shall direct.”). 
Accordingly, this subfactor weighs definitively against 
granting the PLCB sovereign immunity. 
The PLCB instead argues that this subfactor only 
slightly disfavors a finding of sovereign immunity. Appellee’s 
Br. 19. Specifically, the PLCB contends that its funds 
effectively “morph into Commonwealth funds” because the 
funds are subject to a high level of oversight from state 
officials. Id. Therefore, an adverse judgment’s practical effect 
would constitute a state legal obligation to keep the PLCB 
afloat. Id.  
We do not agree. Although practical effects arguments 
have, on occasion, “enter[ed] [our] calculus,” Febres, 445 F.3d 
at 236, such instances have been limited to situations where 
“Congress has put a proverbial ‘gun to the head’ of the State to 
sustain the entity even without a legal obligation.” Maliandi, 
845 F.3d at 87 n.7 (citing Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska 
R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an adverse 
judgment against the state agency had the practical effect of 
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impacting the state’s treasury because federal law effectively 
required Alaska to keep the entity operational); Morris v. 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (finding that a judgment against the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority would directly affect 
Maryland and Virginia’s treasuries because of their practical 
financial commitments to the entity)).  
Here, we find the PLCB’s argument unavailing, as the 
state is not legally obligated to pay for an adverse judgment, 
and there is no legislative coercion for the state to do so. 
Though the practical effects argument is not convincing in 
terms of this subfactor, the state’s high level of control over the 
PLCB is relevant to the third subfactor—the PLCB’s 
autonomy—and, accordingly, we will discuss it below. Fitchik, 
873 F.2d at 660 (reasoning that New Jersey’s veto power over 
New Jersey Transit’s operations indicated a lack of autonomy 
from the state, not financial dependency). 
In sum, as the PLCB is responsible for the payment of 
judgments, and the state has no legal obligation to indemnify 
it, this subfactor points definitively against affording the PLCB 
sovereign immunity.  
ii. 
The second subfactor requires us to determine whether 
the entity has money to pay an adverse judgment, and whether 
“the entity has sources of funding aside from state 
appropriations” that could satisfy the judgment. Maliandi, 845 
F.3d at 88; accord Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 660–62. We also 
consider the degree of control the state maintains over any 
funds it appropriates to the entity. See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661.   
  The PLCB obtains revenue from the sale of liquor, 
which is then deposited into the State Stores Fund, a “separate 
fund from the State Treasury.” Heppler v. Pa. Liquor Control 
Bd., No. 10-3430, 2011 WL 2881221, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 
2011). Money in the State Stores Fund is appropriated by the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly to the PLCB for its daily 
operations, and for “otherwise administering and enforcing the 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Act.” 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 744–
907. This includes the payment of judgments entered against 
the PLCB. Heppler, 2011 WL 2881221, at *5 (finding that a 
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“payment of a judgment against the PLCB would be paid out 
of the State Stores Fund”). In the event that the PLCB did not 
have sufficient funds to satisfy a judgment, it could “obtain 
sufficient funds by raising its revenues.” Id.; accord Christy v. 
Pa. Turnpike Comm’n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1146–47 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission could 
pay for a judgment through its “power to raise revenue levels 
by increasing the toll rates”).  
Alternatively, if the PLCB was unable to satisfy a 
judgment, the state could transfer funds to it as directed by the 
Governor; however, the PLCB would be required to reimburse 
the state “no[] later than thirty days after the end of such fiscal 
year or period.” 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 744–911. Funds 
appropriated to the PLCB effectively operate as a loan, 
indicating that the state exerts some financial control over it. 
This control is, however, outweighed by the PLCB’s ability to 
satisfy a judgment with its own source of revenue and to raise 
additional funds without significant state involvement. This 
demonstrates a level of financial independence not 
characteristic of an entity considered an arm of the state. 
Accordingly, this subfactor tilts away from a finding of 
sovereign immunity. 
iii. 
The third subfactor instructs us to determine whether 
the state has immunized itself from the entity’s debts. Fitchik, 
873 F.2d at 659. If the state has absolved itself of 
responsibility, this suggests that the entity is not considered an 
arm of the state. Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 90.  
There is no specific provision in the Liquor Code that 
immunizes the state from the PLCB’s liabilities. When 
assessing this subfactor, the Heppler Court found that the 
PLCB is likely expected to pay off its own debts because there 
is a provision in the Liquor Code, see 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 744-
910, that instructs the PLCB to transfer any surplus revenue to 
the state, “indicating solvency beyond its operating budget.” 
Heppler, 2011 WL 2881221, at *5. Moreover, any temporary 
loans to the PLCB must be repaid within the fiscal year. Id.; 
see 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 744-911. Thus, this subfactor weighs 
slightly against affording immunity. 
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 In summary, because the state is not legally responsible 
for adverse judgments, the PLCB can satisfy a judgment using 
revenue obtained from liquor sales, and the PLCB is 
responsible for its own debts, the funding factor weights 
definitively against granting the PLCB sovereign immunity.  
B. 
The second factor requires us to examine whether state 
law treats the PLCB as an arm of the state. Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
659. We consider four subfactors: (1) how the law treats the 
agency generally; (2) whether the agency is separately 
incorporated; (3) whether the agency can sue and be sued in its 
own right; (4) and whether it is immune from state taxation. Id.  
i. 
Pennsylvania statutory and case law indicate that the 
PLCB is considered an arm of the state for sovereign immunity 
purposes. First, Pennsylvania’s state sovereign immunity 
statute grants the PLCB state sovereign immunity except under 
specific circumstances. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(b)(7) 
(excepting sovereign immunity for the sale of liquor to “any 
minor, or to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane 
person, or to any person known as an habitual drunkard, or of 
known intemperate habit”); see also Heppler, 2011 WL 
2881221, at *6 (citing that the “PLCB is an agency which is 
entitled to sovereign immunity pursuant to the state sovereign 
immunity statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8522(a)”).  
Furthermore, Pennsylvania state courts have 
consistently found that the PLCB is an arm of the state entitled 
to state sovereign immunity. See Merchs.’ Warehouse Co. v. 
Gelder, 36 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa. 1944) (“The [PLCB] is an 
agency of this Commonwealth created by it for the purpose of 
carrying out a state function and for this reason is clothed with 
immunity from suit.”); Biello v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 301 
A.2d 849, 852 (Pa. 1973) (reaffirming the holding in Gelder); 
Brey v. Commonwealth, 381 A.2d 228, 229 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1978). 
Finally, in Karns, we considered the extent to which 
New Jersey Transit officers are vested with “general authority, 
without limitation, to exercise police powers.” Karns, 879 F.3d 
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at 517. We concluded that “New Jersey law regards NJ Transit 
as exercising the official police powers of the state.” Id. Here, 
the PLCB was created under the Liquor Code as “an exercise 
of the police power of the Commonwealth for the protection of 
the public welfare, health, peace and morals of the people of 
the Commonwealth.” 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1-104(a). This too 
supports the view that Pennsylvania law regards the PLCB as 
an arm of the state.  
Though general treatment under state law is 
informative, it is not dispositive; this subfactor “does not 
necessarily overshadow the other relevant subfactors.” Cooper 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 308 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Thus, we note that the PLCB is generally treated as an arm of 
the state under state law, and continue our analysis of the 
second factor. 
ii. 
Next, we review the entity’s corporation status. When 
an entity is separately incorporated, this weighs against 
affording the entity sovereign immunity. Febres, 445 F.3d at 
230–31.  
 The PLCB argues that it does not have a separate 
corporate existence because the Liquor Code does not 
explicitly state whether the PLCB is separately incorporated. 
Appellee’s Br. 20. Patterson argues, however, that the PLCB is 
separately incorporated because the Liquor Code defines it as 
an “independent administrative board.” Appellant’s Br. 11 
(quoting 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2-201). 
  We have repeatedly held that an entity is separately 
incorporated when there is statutory language explicitly stating 
the same. See Cooper, 548 F.3d at 307 (citing 74 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 1711(a)) (finding an entity to be separately incorporated 
under its enabling statute, which stated that it has “a separate 
corporate existence”); Febres, 445 F.3d at 230 (citing N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 18A:10-1) (considering a New Jersey entity separately 
incorporated based on a state statute’s language stating “under 
the supervision of a board of education, which shall be a body 
corporate”); Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
27:25-4(a) (creating NJ Transit as “a body corporate and politic 
with corporate succession”)). 
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Here, there is no explicit statutory provision stating that 
the PLCB is separately incorporated, and Patterson does not 
offer any evidence as to why the PLCB being an “independent 
agency” is relevant to its incorporation status. Therefore, we 
find Patterson’s argument unconvincing, and that this 
subfactor favors a finding of sovereign immunity. 
iii. 
The Liquor Code does not give the PLCB power to sue 
or be sued as a separate entity from the Commonwealth, setting 
the PLCB apart from many other entities created by 
Pennsylvania law. Compare 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2-207 
(demonstrating that enumerated powers of the PLCB do not 
include ability to sue or be sued); with 4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
1202(b)(3) (listing capacity to sue or be sued under general 
powers of Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board); and 36 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 652d (powers of Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Commission include ability to sue and be sued); and 40 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 4103 (stating that the Pennsylvania Interstate 
Insurance Product Regulation Compact can “bring and 
prosecute legal proceedings or actions in its name as the 
Commission”). Accordingly, the fact that the Liquor Code 
does not state that the PLCB can sue and be sued as its own 
agency indicates that PLCB does not have this power. 
Patterson argues that the PLCB has the ability to sue and 
be sued as its own entity due to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s holding in Pennsylvania Liquor Control 
Board. v. Rapistan, Inc., 371 A.2d 178 (Pa. 1976). Appellant’s 
Br. 10-11. This argument is misguided. In Rapistan, the court 
stated that the “PLCB could institute an action before [a 
Commonwealth Court]. However, [the court] stated that the 
suit should be brought by the Commonwealth and not by the 
individual agency.” Rapistan, 371 A.2d at 185 n.10. Thus, it is 
clear that Rapistan did not permit the PLCB to bring suit as an 
individual agency; rather, Rapistan allowed the PLCB to sue 
under the name of Commonwealth.  
Thus, we find that this subfactor also leans towards a 
finding of sovereign immunity.  
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iv. 
There is no statutory indication that the PLCB is 
immune from state taxation. Compare 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8-
803 (failing to discuss taxation requirements under the general 
duties of the PLCB), with 36 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 653(m) (stating 
that the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission “shall not be 
required to pay any taxes or assessments on any property 
acquired or used by it.”). The PLCB does not, however, pay 
taxes on its revenues, property, or bonds, “suggest[ing] that 
Pennsylvania state law considers the PLCB an arm of the 
state.” Heppler, 2011 WL 2881221, at *7.  Thus, this subfactor 
factor slightly favors sovereign immunity. 
v. 
In sum, three of the four subfactors only slightly tilt 
toward granting immunity: separate incorporation, power to 
sue and be sued, and immunity from state taxes.  The remaining 
subfactor, consideration of the PLCB as an arm of the state 
under Pennsylvania statutory and case law, tips the balance in 
favor of granting the PLCB sovereign immunity under the 
second factor. 
C. 
The third factor instructs us to examine the degree to 
which an entity is autonomous from the state, while “focusing 
on the entity’s governing structure and the oversight and 
control exerted by a State’s governor and legislature.” 
Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 96 (citing Febres, 445 F.3d at 231–32; 
accord Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663–64). 
There are numerous statutory provisions in the Liquor 
Code that indicate the PLCB is subject to substantial oversight 
from the state. First, the executive and legislative branches 
have significant control over the PLCB in terms of the 
composition of the Board. See 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2-201–
204. For example, the Governor appoints the members of the 
Board with consent of the Senate, id. § 2-201; appoints the 
chairman of the Board, id. § 2-203; and can appoint a secretary 
of the Board, id. § 2-204.   
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Additionally, the state imposes several constraints on 
the members of the Board: the Liquor Code proscribes how 
long they may serve on the Board, id. § 2-201; denotes how old 
Board members must be, id. § 2-202(a); prohibits members 
from holding any other office or position while serving on the 
Board, id. § 2-202(b); and requires Board members to follow 
the State Public Official and Employee Ethics Law, id. § 2-
206.1. 
The state also prescribes the general powers of the 
Board and specifies how it shall operate, including the general 
powers of the Board; id. § 2-207; the types of regulations the 
PLCB is permitted to create are predefined by state statute; id. 
§ 2-208; and the state directs the PLCB to transfer two percent 
of its annual profits from the sale of liquor to the Department 
of Health; id. § 8-802(c). 
The PLCB does have some autonomy, however, in that 
it has the power to grant and revoke liquor licenses, lease 
buildings for liquor stores, and make certain regulations that it 
deems necessary for the efficient administration of the Liquor 
Code. Heppler, 2011 WL 2881221, at *7. Nonetheless, these 
powers were ascribed by the state and are still subject to the 
Administrative Code. 47 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2-206.  
In sum, the PLCB is subject to substantial oversight 
from the state. Therefore, we find that this factor weighs 
definitively in favor of finding that the PLCB is an arm of the 
state.   
D. 
We now balance the three factors to determine whether 
the PLCB is an arm of the state. Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 84. 
Again, it is important to note that “courts should not simply 
engage in a formulaic or mechanical counting up of the 
factors.” Karns, 879 F.3d at 513–14. Rather, we must assess 
“the qualitative strength of each factor in the context of the 
circumstances presented.” Id. at 519.   
The funding factor strongly weighs against affording 
sovereign immunity, as the PLCB has significant financial 
independence from the state. The “status under the law” factor, 
though less definitive, tips in favor of immunity because 
Pennsylvania statutory and case law overwhelmingly views the 
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PLCB as an arm of the state. The autonomy factor weighs 
strongly in favor of immunity because the PLCB is subject to 
substantial oversight and control from the state’s executive and 
legislative branches. On balance, the first and third factors 
effectively cancel each other out, as they point in opposite 
directions. The PLCB’s status under Pennsylvania law tips the 
scale in favor of the PLCB being considered an arm of the state. 
We therefore conclude the PLCB is an arm of the state that is 
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.2 
* * * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court granting the PLCB’s motion to dismiss. 
                                                 
2 In so holding, Patterson's claim fails for a separate reason: a 
state, including an entity that is an arm of the state, is not a 
"person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore cannot be sued 
for damages under that statute. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70-71 (1989). 
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